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While philosophers and psychologists continue to debate the existence of free will 
without reaching any consensus, recent attention has shifted to the matter of the consequences of 
belief in free will, or belief in the alternative, determinism. Proponents of the latter position 
argue that human behavior is the result of causal forces, which implies a lack of autonomy in 
decision-making and inevitability (Paulhus & Carey, 2011). Recent research has found 
consequences of belief in determinism that include the promotion of undesirable behavior and 
undermining of moral behavior (Vohs & Schooler, 2008), impulsive and selfish responses 
demonstrated through aggression (Baumeister, Masicampo, & DeWall, 2009), and a diminished 
ability to learn from negative emotions (Stillman & Baumeister, 2010). Belief in determinism 
may be a belief that allows some to abrogate moral responsibility, which may facilitate other 
antisocial tendencies. Objectification (i.e., seeing and ultimately treating a person as an object in 
a manner that dismisses that persons’ humanity) may be one such tendency. To my knowledge, 
no research has examined the association between belief in determinism, interpersonal 
objectification, and the Dark Triad (Paulhus & Williams, 2002). In the present research, four 
questionnaires measured participants’ belief in free will, determinism, propensity to objectify 
others, narcissism, psychopathy, and Machiavellianism. Results indicated a statistically 
significant link between belief in determinism, interpersonal objectification, and the Dark Triad 
personality traits. A general mediation model demonstrated that interpersonal objectification 
mediated the relation between belief in determinism and the Dark Triad personality traits. These 
findings suggest that maladaptive ideologies and maladaptive personality traits share a common 
theme of objectifying others. Implications, limitations, and future directions are discussed. 
KEYWORDS: dark personality; determinism; moral responsibility; objectification 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
The issue of whether free will exists has been a religious and philosophical debate for 
centuries. Belief or disbelief in free will is now considered more than philosophical opinion or 
religious ideology. Of late, attention has shifted to understanding how belief or disbelief in free 
will may operate within society and influence social interactions (e.g., Baumeister & Brewer, 
2012; Bergner & Ramon, 2013; Carey & Paulhus, 2013; Moynihan, Igou, & van Tilburg, 2017; 
Vohs and Schooler, 2008; Zhao, Liu, Zhang, Shi, & Huang, 2014). An individual’s philosophical 
beliefs, such as disbelief or belief in free will, have the potential to cause distinct patterns of 
overt behavior (Carmody & Gordon, 2014). Studying the behavioral consequences of disbelief in 
free will is particularly important because of the negative outcomes associated (Caspar, 
Vuillaume, Magalhães De Saldanha da Gama, & Cleeremans, 2017). Disbelief in free will was 
found to predict devious, egocentric, aggressive, and conforming behavior, to thwart helpfulness, 
diminish learning from adverse emotions, and increase prejudice and judgment (Baumeister & 
Brewer, 2012; Genschow, Rigoni, & Brass, 2017). 
The correlates and effects of belief in free will have been studied through measurement 
(Nadelhoffer, Shepard, Nahmias, Sripada, & Ross, 2014; Paulhus & Carey, 2011; Rakos, 
Laurene, Skala, & Slane, 2008) and experimental manipulation (Alquist, Ainsworth, & 
Baumeister, 2013; Baumeister, Masicampo, & DeWall, 2009; Vohs & Schooler, 2008). Results 
have demonstrated an association between belief in determinism and antisocial and aggressive 
behavior (Baumeister, Masicampo, DeWall, 2009), diminished prosocial behavior (Stillman & 
Baumeister, 2010), and a reduced sense of moral responsibility (Shariff, Greene, Karremans, 
Luguri, Clark, Schooler, Baumeister, & Vohs, 2014). 
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The purpose of the present study is to further examine potential implications of believing 
in free will; more specifically, if and how a belief in the alternative, determinism, may affect 
individuals’ behavior and psychological wellbeing. It is my intention to expand upon existing 
research, research that currently supports the position that belief in determinism may lead 
individuals to identify less with the notion of moral responsibility. Relatedly, I am interested in 
determining if there is a relationship between belief in determinism and four other variables: (1) 
an individual’s tendency to objectify others; (2) the presence of narcissism; (3) the presence of 
some degree of psychopathy; and (4) the presence of some degree of Machiavellianism 
(collectively, the latter three have been termed “the Dark Triad”[Paulhus & Williams, 2002]). 
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CHAPTER II: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Belief in Free Will 
Belief in free will can be conceptualized as involving an individual’s sense of agency and 
responsibility. The belief in free will can be further described as an individual’s belief in their 
ability to sustain autonomy in their behavior, which includes belief in morality and an internal 
locus of control (Paulhus & Carey, 2011). Belief in free will encourages individuals to consider 
multiple possibilities, provided there are alternatives and more desirable actions, and ultimately 
take responsibility for their chosen actions (Baumeister & Brewer, 2012). Such a belief holds 
that decisions are made by genuine choices of individuals who, given behavioral alternatives of 
which they are aware, choose from and perform one of these (Bergner & Ramon, 2013).  
As laypersons define it, belief in free will is the belief that one has the ability to make 
choices that are in line with their thoughts, feelings, and desires, that are unconstrained by 
external factors, contingent upon planning and forethought (Feldman, Baumeister, & Wong, 
2014). Philosophical theory argues that belief in free will is a necessary prerequisite for moral 
responsibility. Recent literature has supported the notion that laypersons associate the belief in 
free will with moral choice and one’s ability to learn, mature, and behave differently (Feldman, 
Wong, & Baumeister, 2016). 
Recent skepticism has questioned the validity of beliefs in free will, and instead 
supported the alternative position known as “determinism.” Belief in determinism is essentially 
antithetical to a belief in free will. Philosophers typically define determinism as a philosophical 
position that argues that, as things are now in the present, there is only one possibility for the 
future. Determinism holds that there are no alternatives, instead there is only one possible future 
(Müller & Placek, 2018). According to scientists, determinism is not a proven fact; rather it is a 
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crucial assumption. It is an assumption that claims that human thoughts and actions are 
determined in advance and are subject to deterministic causality; essentially arguing that human 
behavior is the result of causal forces set in motion at the time of the origin of a behavior 
(Baumeister et al., 2009). For example, one recent, neuroscientifically-based version of 
determinism argues that human behavior involves the firing of neurons that cause thoughts and 
eventually actions. These firings can then be connected in a causal chain back to birth, therefore 
arguing that individuals are not actually in control of their behavior (Cave, 2016). This belief 
places the responsibility for decision-making on external forces. 
Considering the complex nature of the concept and the consequences associated with 
these beliefs, psychologists have utilized multidimensional scales to understand these beliefs. To 
further understand the current conceptualization of belief in free will and determinism, I explored 
the established scales used to measure these philosophical positions. 
Free Will and Determinism Scale 
The Free Will-Determinism Scale (Viney, Waldman, & Barchilon, 1982) was originally 
developed to understand the philosophy of punishment and beliefs in free will and determinism. 
In this scale, Viney et al. (1982) defined free will as, “the doctrine that assumes that we make 
real choices which are partially or completely independent of antecedent conditions. 
Determinism denies this and maintains that causation is operative in all human affairs. Thus, so-
called choices are influenced or determined by antecedent conditions” (p. 946). 
FAD–Plus: Free Will and Determinism 
Based on the preliminary, unpublished version (FAD-4; Paulhus & Margesson, 1994), 
Paulhus and Carey (2011) developed a measure of lay beliefs in free will and associated 
constructs. The 27-item FAD–Plus includes four subscales: Free Will, Scientific Determinism, 
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Fatalistic determinism, and Unpredictability. This measure included key constructs, refrained 
from the use of philosophical jargon, avoided incompatibilist assumptions, and increased relative 
independence of subscales. 
Paulhus and Carey (2011) distinguished between two distinct types of determinism: 
scientific and fatalistic. Scientific determinism places an emphasis on “scientific causality” (p. 
102), in turn, scientific determinism relies on both an internal and external locus of control. This 
position allows for decision-making, recognizing that not everything is predetermined. Fatalistic 
determinism argues for causal explanations of inevitability and lack of autonomy in decision-
making. At the extreme, fatalistic determinism places behavioral control strictly on inevitable 
external forces and maintains that something is going to happen no matter what. Unpredictability 
argues that free will exists as a result of scientists inability to predict human behavior without 
fault, and conversely, not believing in determinism is not obligatory for believing in free will 
(Paulhus & Carey, 2011). 
While previous measures of belief in free will maintained incompatibilist assumptions 
(i.e., belief in free will and determinism are mutually exclusive positions), Paulhus and Carey 
(2011) found that free will and determinism are compatible. Explained in a later study, Carey 
and Paulhus (2013) argue that individuals typically believe in free will and determinism, and a 
disbelief in one does not require the belief in the other. Research suggests that a majority of 
individuals believe in free will, “at least to some extent” (Carey & Paulhus, 2013, p. 138), while 
at the same time, individuals understand that some decisions are externally influenced 
(Baumeister, 2008). 
Within this measure, Paulhus and Carey (2011) unwittingly captured the concept of locus 
of control explained by Rotter (1966). Acknowledging the similarity of the concepts, Paulhus 
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and Carey (2011) intentionally distinguished between free will and determinism, and internal and 
external locus of control. Conceptually, free will beliefs are compatible with an internal locus of 
control with the inclusion of moral responsibility. Scientific determinism includes both an 
internal and external locus of control. Conversely, fatalistic determinism assumes inevitability of 
external forces. While these constructs closely resemble the notion of locus of control, the FAD–
Plus does not directly coincide with internal and external locus of control. Surprisingly, authors 
explained a modest relation between unpredictability and fatalistic determinism, potentially 
because fate and unpredictability are external forces and remain unknowable (Paulhus & Carey, 
2011). 
Free Will Inventory 
Previous results have been difficult to interpret, and the psychometric tools used to 
measure these beliefs have been arguably problematic. On that account, Nadelhoffer and 
colleagues (2014) recognized the importance of considering the researchers conceptualization of 
free will and how this may influence their experiments, line of questioning, and interpretation of 
results. For those reasons, Nadelhoffer et al. (2014) developed a self-report measure to address 
the limitations of the previously established measures (e.g., theory contamination, incompatibilist 
assumption, limited diversity in sampling). The Free Will Inventory (FWI) avoids the use of 
incompatibilist assumptions and, instead captures a broader range of beliefs and attitudes. The 
final scale included two parts; part 1 included fifteen items that successfully measures 
independent constructs of free will, determinism, and dualism/anti-reductionism. Part 2 includes 
fourteen statements that measure the strength and relationship of beliefs in free will, 
determinism, and dualism. 
 7 
Effects of Belief in Free Will vs. Determinism 
Vohs and Schooler (2008) conducted a study that assessed participants’ likelihood to 
cheat after being exposed to a message prompting them to believe that all human behavior is 
essentially predetermined. Results demonstrated that subjection to a message claiming that free 
will does not exist can increase passive and active cheating. These findings suggest that disbelief 
in free will had the potential to promote undesirable behavior and undermine moral behavior. 
Using an adapted version of Vohs and Schooler’s (2008) free will belief manipulation, 
Baumeister, Masicampo, and DeWall (2009) conducted several experiments looking to 
investigate disbelief in free will as it pertains to self-control and the likelihood to exert 
helpfulness or aggression. Results suggested that, independent of mood and emotion, disbelief in 
free will leads to impulsive and selfish responses, demonstrated through aggression and refusal 
to help. 
Stillman and Baumeister (2010) later argued that belief in free will serves as an 
influential factor in learning from emotions and that disbelief in free will might sabotage learning 
from emotional experiences. Within the study, participants were asked to consider past actions 
that they felt guilty about and communicate any lessons they may have taken away from them. 
Those who believed more strongly in free will, and identified themselves as feeling guilty, 
derived more valuable lessons than those who believed in free will to a lesser extent, if at all. 
These results suggested that belief in determinism diminished individuals’ learning from 
emotional experiences. 
In a later study, Carey and Paulhus (2013) investigated political orientation, moral 
attitudes, and punitiveness as they relate to belief in free will. In their study, participants were 
asked to read a vignette depicting a child molester and later recommended a sufficient prison 
 8 
sentence for the offender. Participants were then presented with further information explaining 
that the molester had been abused as a child and suffered from psychopathology. After 
introducing these details, participants were able to revise their original recommended prison 
sentence. Results of this study showed that participants with a greater belief in free will were 
more likely to recommend a longer prison sentence; conversely, a belief in scientific 
determinism or fatalism had no effect. This research suggests a link between belief in free will, 
conservative social attitudes, obligatory moral foundations, and retributive punishment of 
theoretical criminals. That is to say, an individual capable of exerting more self-control is more 
likely to be highly conscientious and supportive of a conservative worldview that upholds moral 
foundations (Carey & Paulhus, 2013). 
Bergner and Ramon (2013) argued that the notion of reduced responsibility is associated 
with alterations in the individual’s actual behavior and with the belief that, if one has no choice 
in the matter, there is no morality to be considered. Bergner and Ramon (2013) investigated the 
association between beliefs in altruism, free will, and nonreductionism (i.e., the view that argues 
that thoughts, beliefs, and motives cannot be reduced to just the brain and physiological 
processes) in comparison with the opposing beliefs in psychological egoism, determinism, and 
biological reductionism. Results of their study demonstrated that altruism, belief in free will, and 
nonreductionism were strongly correlated with “a heightened sense of meaning in life, higher 
levels of life satisfaction, a belief in morality as a legitimate and important dimension in life, and 
higher standards of personal moral conduct” (Bergner & Ramon, 2013, p. 610). This furthers the 
argument that belief in free will is valuable and adaptive to human society through the support of 
prosocial behavior and reduction of antisocial behavior. 
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Recognizing that belief in free will implies the absence of external factors outside of 
one’s own thoughts, values, and choices, Alquist, Ainsworth, and Baumeister (2013) argued that 
belief in free will reduces conformity. Using several studies, these authors found that a 
diminished belief in free will resulted in an increased likelihood to conform to others’ opinions 
regardless of mood and emotion. Therefore, Alquist et al. (2013) posited that belief in free will 
encourages individuals to act on their own volition and think for themselves, whereas reduced 
belief in free will is associated with low volitional effort and self-control. 
Feldman, Wong, and Baumeister (2016) later extended the concept of belief in free will 
beyond morality and punishment, to consider accountability; arguing that, the notion of 
accountability in this sense is referring to the “acknowledgement and assumption of 
responsibility. Thus, if a behavior or an outcome deviates from the expected, then an accountable 
person accepts their own role and seeks to learn from mistakes and correct future actions” (p. 
27). In this sense, a judgment based on accountability is ultimately a decision that an individual 
could have acted differently, implying that they could have done so in the first place. This 
assertion supports the conception that most laypersons have regarding the belief in free will; that 
is to say, that an individual has the ability to make a choice in whether to act differently in the 
same situation (Feldman et al., 2016). A lack of felt responsibility or accountability may lead 
individuals to  detach themselves from the decision-making process with the belief that weighing 
moral and ethical consequences of behavior makes no difference. As a result, individuals who 
hold deterministic views may stop seeing themselves as accountable for their actions and 
ultimately void of blameworthiness; as such, they may be more willing to give into their 
impulses and act less responsibly (Cave, 2016). 
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In research relevant to mental health issues, disbelief in free will has been associated with 
addiction and has been studied with regard to behavioral control in psychopaths. The large 
majority of health professionals, and consequently the public, understands addiction as a disease 
that is caused by an interaction between an individual’s brain and foreign substances, classified 
as addictive drugs. However, there has been an increase in literature regarding a controversial 
view, that addiction is more or less a disorder of choice (Glannon, 2011). For this reason, 
Vonasch and colleagues (2017) conducted a study to examine the relationship between belief in 
free will and addiction. Results demonstrated that individuals with lower belief in free will were 
more likely to have a history of alcohol or drug addiction, and that addiction can be understood 
as a loss of free will. Interestingly, this study found that belief in free will as it relates to 
addiction can work in both directions, that inducing disbelief in free will led individuals to see 
more addiction in the world, and that reading arguments opposing the belief in free will led 
individuals to ridicule their own self-control. These authors concluded that, “while people 
associate becoming addicted with loss of free will, they associate quitting addiction with 
increased free will” (Vonasch, Clark, Lau, Vohs, & Baumeister, 2017, p. 65). 
Overall, previous research on the effects of belief in free will seems to suggest that both 
personal and societal gain lie in believing and acting in ways that support persons believing in 
autonomy of choice and free will. The individual is left with a sense of responsibility for their 
choices and the repercussions of the behavioral alternative chosen. Holding this view, individuals 
may be more mindful in their decision-making process, allocating more attention to their 
decisions, rather than acting impulsively. 
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Objectification 
First introduced by Immanuel Kant, the word objectification is most commonly used in a 
derogatory manner to describe the treatment of individuals solely as a means to an end; treating 
an individual as an object that is evaluated based on what the objectified can do for the 
objectifier. Objectification is seeing and ultimately treating a person as an object in a manner that 
dismisses that person’s humanity. For Kant, objectification involved the harming of an 
individual’s humanity, which is an individual’s capacity for rational choice and nature. Humanity 
allows humans to determine what is valuable and take steps to promote that value. Therefore, 
Kant stresses, “humanity is never treated merely as a means, but always as an end in itself” 
(Papadaki, 2010, p. 18). Objectification is considered a medium for subjugation by which an 
objectifier disregards or diminishes the needs and interests of the target. The process of 
objectification involves, “instrumental fragmentation in social perception, the splitting of a 
whole person into parts that serve specific goals and functions for the observer” (Gruenfeld, 
Inesi, Magee, & Galinsky, 2008, p. 111). 
Freud argued that objectification was essentially infantile narcissism at a young age, and 
that objectification is considered developmentally appropriate and even necessary, as a means for 
survival at a young age. However, when the self-centeredness and objectification continue into 
adulthood, as it does to some degree for everyone, it can become problematic and, in some cases, 
may develop into narcissistic personality disorder (Fast, 1985). 
Nussbaum’s Conceptualization 
American Philosopher Martha Nussbaum, known for her literary works on 
objectification, explained objectification using seven dimensions. In Nussbaum’s paper, 
“Objectification” (1995), she introduced the seven nonhierarchical classifications of 
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instrumentality, denial of autonomy, inertness, fungibility, violability, ownership, and denial of 
subjectivity as ways in which possessions are treated. Nussbaum defined these as: 
1. Instrumentality: The objectifier treats the object as a tool for his or her purposes 
2. Denial of autonomy: The objectifier treats the object as lacking in autonomy and self-
determination. 
3. Inertness: The objectifier treats the object as lacking in agency, and perhaps also in 
activity. 
4. Fungibility: The objectifier treats the object as interchangeable (a) with other objects of 
the same type, and/or (b) with objects of other types. 
5. Violability: The objectifier treats the object as lacking in boundary-integrity; as 
something that is permissible to break up, smash, or break into. 
6. Ownership: The objectifier treats the object as something that is owned by another, can 
be bought or sold, etc. 
7. Denial of subjectivity: The objectifier treats the object as something whose experience 
and feelings (if any) need not be taken into account (Nussbaum, 1995, p. 257). 
Emphasized in this description is the idea that objectification is the “making into a thing, 
treating as a thing, something that is not really a thing,” and the process of objectification is the 
treatment of human beings in one or more of these ways (Nussbaum, 1995, p. 257). From the 
seven prototypical features, Nussbaum determined that denial of autonomy and instrumentality 
are the necessary features of objectification. Autonomy is an important function of moral 
equality; therefore, the denial of an individual’s autonomy is the denial of his or her personhood. 
Once autonomy is revoked, the objectified individual is degraded, violated, and subject to 
replacement, like that of an object (Cahill, 2011). Cahill (2011) notes that instrumentality has the 
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potential to result in denial of autonomy, “when it does so, it becomes morally problematic; and 
indeed, given the close conceptual relationship between instrumentality and lack of autonomy, 
the former almost always entails the latter” (p. 15). 
When used in psychological research, objectification considers what is emphasized (i.e., 
the body), whereas objectification, in the philosophical sense, emphasizes what is denied (i.e., 
humanity) (Loughnan, Haslam, Murnane, Vaes, Reynolds, & Suitner, 2010). Loughnan and 
colleagues (2010) found that objectification influenced depersonalization, regardless of gender. 
More specifically, “ as objectification increased, mind attribution decreased, and moral status 
was withdrawn” (p.716).  
Orehek and Weaverling (2017) argued that, in terms of psychological principles, 
objectification requires the perception and evaluation of targets based on their instrumentality to 
an actor’s goal. Instrumentality is then established through the means-goal mental relationship, 
which is reinforced when the goal is successfully achieved (Orehek & Weaverling, 2017). The 
goal system theory (Shah, Kruglanski, & Friedman, 2003) posits that goals are associated with 
their means of achievement through their instrumental associations. This instrumentality is 
determined through knowledge that the means will lead to the achievement of the particular goal. 
Perceived instrumentality mediates the relationship between means-goal association and goal 
performance, with high perceived instrumentality leading to greater execution in goal pursuit 
(Zhang & Tu, 2011). If a strong association between the attainment-means and the goal exists, 
individuals will perceive more instrumentality in goal achievement and the goal will be pursued 
at the others expense (Rector, 2017). 
From this psychological perspective, instrumental attraction leads to instrumental 
behavior and approach toward the objectified target with an emphasis on a target’s usefulness in 
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achieving the actor’s goal (Gruenfeld et al., 2008). Gruenfeld and colleagues (2008) argued that 
goals can affect how targets are evaluated in ongoing relationships and influence the evaluation 
and choice of new relationship partners, regardless of their human qualities. In six studies, these 
authors found that individuals with greater power were more attracted to a target’s usefulness 
with respect to the observers’ goals, in comparison to those with lower power. Using an 
objectification scale associated with power and work relationships, Gruenfeld et al. (2008) found 
that individuals reported greater objectification in relationships with subordinates than peers, and 
individuals high in power generally reported a higher level of objectification in relationships 
with peers. 
Rector (2017) argued that objectification, while potentially problematic, is not always 
dehumanizing. Instead, it can be viewed as a continuum that includes causal indifference, 
derivatization, and dehumanization. These categories may differ; however, their underlying 
perceptual mechanism is the same, the targets are seen as objects that aid in goal achievement. 
Within this continuum it is recognized that objectification, at a certain level (i.e., causal 
indifference), is inevitable to human beings and that it can be adaptive and advantageous to the 
individual. Causal indifference denotes a tendency to deny and suppress others’ suffering, 
because objectification includes viewing others as lacking subjectivity and feelings, it can be 
beneficial to the objectifier to remain unaffected or unmoved by the feelings and emotions of 
others. At this end of the spectrum, there is no purposeful intent to be cruel or inflict harm onto 
others; instead, causal indifference is the demonstration of inaction (Rector, 2017). 
To explain more purposeful objectification, Cahill (2011) proposes the use of the term 
“derivatization.” She stated that,  
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“If ‘objectify’ means ‘to turn into an object,’ then ‘derivatize’ means ‘to turn into a 
derivative…to derivatize is to portray, render, understand, or approach a being solely or 
primarily as the reflection, projection, or expression of another being’s identity, desires, 
fears, etc. The derivatized subject becomes reducible in all relevant ways to the 
derivatizing subject’s existence—other elements of [their] being or subjectivity are 
disregarded, ignored or under-valued’” (p. 32). 
The target of objectification is stripped of their autonomy and subjectivity as a method 
for use in goal pursuit. Further defined by Rector (2017), derivatization is a process of 
misapprehending other human beings, and one’s awareness of their complexity is confused by 
their own self-boundary, interests, desires, and fears, and others are treated accordingly. This 
makes up a large portion of the continuum toward more dehumanizing classification. The less 
severe form of derivatization includes a blatant lack of respect for others without exercising 
violence, whereas more severe derivatization may involve violent abuse and exploitation. The 
most extreme form of derivatization is “emotional hardening,” where the objectifier is entirely 
insensitive and unsympathetic to the target’s suffering, consequently disregarding their basic 
human rights. However, in this sense, the objectified individual has not yet been completely 
dehumanized (Rector, 2017). 
Dehumanization, considered to be on the extreme end of the objectification continuum, 
occurs when the objectifier sees others as less than human beings and more as objects. 
Dehumanization involves the assumption that an individual is not human, which then requires 
the affirmation that the individual is less than human (Rector, 2017). Causal indifference is 
considered to be adaptive, whereas dehumanization is not. Instead, dehumanization is an 
unconscious strategy for dealing with incompatible psychological motives (Smith, 2011). The 
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dehumanizer’s intent is to rid the individual of their humanity and transform them into 
nonhumans, without violence. This change occurs mentally and is a matter of perception. Once 
the dehumanizer has an altered view of the target, abusive behavior may follow (Rector, 2017). 
Philosophers and psychologists agree that objectifiers stress the importance of the targets’ 
instrumental utility and diminish their personhood. Objectification can be seen in sexual and 
nonsexual contexts, in which the person being objectified lacks warmth, competence, moral 
standing, and humanity. The objectified individual lacks two core elements of social perception, 
warmth and competence. As a result, the objectified is viewed as relatively immoral and amoral, 
which develops into dehumanization. Heflick and colleagues (2010) argued that the necessary 
human traits, characteristics of the human mind, and the stereotype content model hold that 
warmth, competence, and morality are the necessary perceptions of humanity. Loughnan et al. 
(2017) found that individuals who are objectified subsequently internalize objectification and see 
themselves as less warm, competent, and human. Interestingly, both men and women are equally 
likely to explicitly or cognitively objectify others, and influence the target, regardless of the 
gender of the objectifier (Loughnan, Baldissarri, Spaccatini, & Elder, 2017). 
The Dark Triad 
Developed by Paulhus and Williams (2002), the Dark Triad refers to three prominent 
non-pathological personality traits: subclinical narcissism, subclinical psychopathy, and 
Machiavellianism. Despite having distinct features, there exists significant overlap among the 
Dark Triad traits, “[as] all three entail a socially malevolent character with behavior tendencies 
toward self-promotion, emotional coldness, duplicity, and aggressiveness” (Paulhus & Williams, 
2002, p. 557). These related, yet theoretically distinct personality traits are characterized by 
varying degrees of grandiosity, callousness, deceit, and aggression (Kowalski, Kwiatkowska, 
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Kwiatkowska, Ponikiewska, Rogoza, & Schermer, 2018). These three traits are often considered 
to share a significant overlap that complicates distinction; however, when studied together the 
distinctions is possible (Jones & Paulhus, 2014). 
Narcissism 
According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed.; DSM-5; 
American Psychiatric Association, 2013), “narcissistic personality disorder is a pervasive pattern 
of grandiosity, need for admiration, and lack of empathy that begins by early adulthood and is 
present in a variety of contexts” (p. 670). Individuals diagnosed with narcissistic personality 
disorder typically have an inflated sense of self-importance, believe they are superior, display a 
sense of entitlement that may result in the conscious or unintentional exploitation of others, and 
often have difficulties recognizing the desires, subjective experiences, and feelings of others. 
Interestingly, “many successful individuals display personality traits that might be considered 
narcissistic. Only when these traits are inflexible, maladaptive, and persisting and cause 
significant functional impairment or subjective distress do they constitute narcissistic personality 
disorder” (American Psychological Association, 2013, p. 671). While narcissistic personality 
disorder is rarely diagnosed, narcissistic traits of vanity, arrogance, and lack of empathy are quite 
common (MacDonald, 2014). 
Krizan and Herlache (2018) introduced the narcissism spectrum model as a means of 
conceptualizing narcissistic personality disorder, allowing the integration of personality 
structural and developmental framework and existing theories of narcissism. The narcissism 
spectrum model assumes that narcissistic features result from developmental processes that 
include person-situation transactions. While extreme narcissism is deemed maladaptive and 
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therefore classified as a personality disorder, a certain degree of narcissism is needed for healthy 
self-esteem (Krizan & Herlache, 2018). 
Narcissism refers to the ability to manage self-esteem, needs for affirmation, validation, 
and self-enhancement within the social environment. To laypersons, narcissism is frequently 
associated with arrogance, conceitedness, and authoritarian attitudes and behaviors. Theorists 
suggest that narcissism has adaptive and maladaptive expressions that reflect adaptive and 
maladaptive personality characteristics and psychological needs, which influences one’s need for 
self-enhancement and validation (Pincus & Lukowitsky, 2010). 
The trait approach to non-pathological narcissism, proposed by Raskin and Hall (1979), 
considers narcissism on continuum, which includes personality traits, beliefs, and behaviors that 
differ in the degree to which they are displayed or acted upon. According to MacDonald (2014), 
we all fall somewhere along this continuum, with narcissistic responses ranging from mild to a 
potentially pathological level of narcissism. The lower end of this continuum includes 
individuals who display narcissistic behaviors but are capable of functioning well personally and 
socially (Mielimaka, Ogrodniczuk, Kealy, Cheek, & Joyce, 2018). Healthy narcissism 
incorporates, “a steady sense of one’s worth, based on genuine achievement, the capacity to 
recover from disappointment or failure and the ability to find comfort and support in 
relationships” (MacDonald, 2014, p. 145). On the opposite end of the continuum are those who 
suffer from unhealthy or pathological narcissism. Individuals on this end of the continuum act in 
domineering, vindictive, and disruptive behaviors, leading to issues in maintaining meaningful, 
long-term relationships and experience difficulty in enacting prosocial behaviors due to their 
egocentrism, grandiosity, and poor self-awareness (Mielimaka et al., 2018). Although rare, 
extremely unhealthy narcissism can be classified as narcissistic personality disorder. 
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Narcissism can be categorized into two variants: grandiose and vulnerable. Grandiosity is 
considered a defense against feelings of inferiority that is typically described as, “an inflated 
positive self-image, high self-esteem, exhibitionism, attitudes of entitlement, a tendency toward 
exploitativeness, self-assuredness, aggression, and the need to be admired by others” 
(Zajenkowski, Witowska, Maciantowicz, & Malesza, 2016, p. 102). Grandiose narcissism is 
positively associated with high levels of extraversion, emotional stability, and conscientiousness, 
while negatively correlated with cooperation and morality (Persson, 2019). A study conducted by 
Zajenkowski et al. (2016) demonstrated that narcissism, specifically grandiose narcissism, is 
associated with hedonism, which in turn corresponds to a constant striving toward possession, 
immediate reward, an illusion of control, and overconfidence that allows for the dismissal of 
potential consequences to behavior. 
In contrast, individuals exhibiting vulnerable narcissism are described as needing 
recognition from others that is indicative of their sense of self-worth. This need for admiration 
and validation is directly linked to a vulnerable narcissist’s characteristically low sense of self-
worth, emotional instability, hostility, insecurity, anxiety, and defensiveness (Malesza & 
Kaczmarek, 2018). Vulnerable narcissism is negatively correlated with self-efficacy, openness to 
experience, and various facets of agreeableness (i.e., trust, morality, altruism). Grandiose and 
vulnerable narcissism are separate constructs; however, research suggests that narcissistic 
individuals will fluctuate between grandiose and vulnerable states, and that grandiosity may 
actually serve as a defense against vulnerability (Wright, Stepp, Scott, Hallquist, Beeney, 
Lazarus, & Pilkonis, 2017). Research suggests a stronger association between grandiose 




Antisocial personality disorder (ASPD), as it is explained in the DSM-5, involves “a 
pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of others that begins in childhood or 
early adolescence and continues into adulthood. This pattern has also been referred to as 
‘psychopathy,’ ‘sociopathy,’ and ‘dissocial personality disorder’” (American Psychological 
Association, 2013, p. 659). Narcissistic personality disorder and antisocial personality disorder 
share overlapping features such as a general lack of empathy, exploitation of others, and an 
exaggerated sense of self-importance (Maddux & Winstead, 2016). 
Psychopathy is considered a pattern of personality traits with stimulus seeking, social 
deviance, and interpersonal/affective traits as central features. According to the Hare 
Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R; Hare 1991, 2003), psychopathy is categorized by four 
dimensions: Interpersonal (glibness, grandiose sense of self-worth, pathological lying and 
deception, and manipulativeness); Affective (lack of remorse or guilt, shallow affect, callousness 
and lack of empathy, and failure to accept responsibility); Lifestyle (stimulation seeking, 
parasitic lifestyle, impulsivity, irresponsibility, and lack of realistic goals); and Antisocial (poor 
behavioral controls, early behavior problems, juvenile delinquency, criminal versatility and 
revocation of conditional release). Psychopathy is also categorized by promiscuous sexual 
behavior and numerous short-term relationships (Hare & Neumann, 2008). 
American psychiatrist and pioneer in the field of psychopathy, Hervey Cleckley, 
described a psychopath as “a fully functioning person in every respect except that he cannot feel” 
(Cleckley, 1950, p. 398-399). The emotional deficits associated with psychopathy result in 
further deficits in moral motivation and moral competence. Surprisingly, these deficits do not 
seem to impair their social understanding and social skills, as they are capable of determining 
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what are socially acceptable and morally appropriate responses to an array of situations. This 
ability for maintenance of social awareness enables them to disguise themselves by mimicking 
and acting in ways that are compatible with societal norms and considered morally just, and in 
turn, allowing them to appear sane (Magnani, 2012; Maxwell & Le Sage, 2009). According to 
Cleckley (1984) and Hare (1999), psychopaths possess average, possibly even superior, social 
perspective-taking skills, which may account for the psychopathic traits of manipulativeness and 
deceit. In fact, “it is precisely their strong perspective-taking abilities, aided by very low concern 
for others, that explains why psychopaths are so adept at taking advantage of others” (Maxwell 
& Le Sage, 2009, p. 80). 
Machiavellianism 
Christie and Geis (1970) introduced the concept of Machiavellianism to the personality 
literature, inspired by the publication of the book entitled The Prince, written by Italian 
Renaissance diplomat and political theorist Niccoló Machiavelli in 1532. Throughout this book, 
Machiavelli urges kings and lords to ensure their power through meticulously planned and 
potentially immoral deeds, promoting that the ends will justify the means (Beller & Bosse, 
2017). “Traditionally, the ‘Machiavellian’ is someone who views and manipulates others for 
[their] own purposes” (Christie & Geis, 1970, p. 1). Individuals of this nature typically view 
others as objects to be manipulated, disregard conventional morality, lack overt 
psychopathology, and have low ideological commitment, in an effort to promote their own goals 
(Beller & Bosse, 2017). Machiavellians focus on maintaining their reputation and building 
alliances. They are strategic regarding the tactics employed to pursue the goal, as opposed to 
impulsive like that of psychopaths. These individuals are frequently endowed with high 
inference, reasoning, and planning capabilities (Jones & Paulhus, 2014). 
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Both previously explained features of the Dark Triad, narcissism and psychopathy, are 
associated with clinical disorders; however, Machiavellianism is not. As such, Rauthmann and 
Will (2011) proposed a multidimensional model of Machiavellianism with cognitive, emotional, 
motivational, and behavioral themes. Machiavellians are prototypically characterized by cold 
affect, particularly in interpersonal situations, absence of remorse, and a strategic orientation to 
planning. They may utilize different schemas involving deceit, lying, and cheating, to get what 
they want. All come easy to them given their characteristically cynical attitudes, negative 
worldview, immoral beliefs and self-centeredness. Machiavellians frequently demonstrate 
instrumentality in pursuing materialistic goals (i.e., status, money, power), while showing little 
interest in collective goals (i.e., harmony and love) (Rauthmann & Will, 2011). 
The Present Study 
Previous research has found that belief in free will is positively associated with an 
individual’s sense of autonomy, accountability, and morality, as well as enhanced interpersonal 
relationships and a tendency to contribute positively to societal values. Whereas, the effects of 
not believing in free will, and alternatively believing in determinism, include dishonesty, 
selfishness, aggression, and conforming behavior (Baumeister & Brewer, 2012). 
The present study expanded upon current understanding that belief in determinism is 
related to a general disregard for societal rules and norms, and maladaptive personality traits. 
This finding has been well-supported in many studies, however, one of the possible effects of 
belief in determinism that has not yet been studied is the tendency to objectify other individuals 
(i.e., to essentially see them as less as co-entitled individuals and more as objects that are means 
to one’s own personal ends). Therefore, the primary purpose of this study was to examine the 
effects of belief in determinism as it may relate to interpersonal objectification. More 
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specifically, I investigated whether interpersonal objectification would mediate the relationship 
between belief in determinism and the Dark Triad personality traits of narcissism, psychopathy, 
and Machiavellianism. The present study conceptualized belief in free will and belief in 
determinism using the free will and determinism subscales from the FWI. This measure was 
selected for this study because of the well-established reliability and validity of the measure 
itself. 
Hypotheses 
To my knowledge, no previous research has attempted to investigate the relation between 
belief in determinism and interpersonal objectification; therefore, the primary aim of this study 
was to explore whether belief in determinism was associated with interpersonal objectification. 
Because previous research has demonstrated an association between belief in determinism and 
reduced prosocial tendencies, it was conceivable that belief in determinism may be one such 
belief that allows some to abrogate moral responsibility, and in turn, facilitate other antisocial 
tendencies. Carey and Paulhus (2013) proposed that future studies should investigate how 
disbelief in free will might lead individuals to be less morally critical of others, which this study 
aimed to accomplish.  
Hypothesis 1A was that higher levels of belief in determinism would be positively 
associated with individuals’ propensity to objectify others. Hypothesis 1B was that higher levels 
of belief in free will would be negatively associated with individuals’ propensity to objectify 
others. More specifically, belief in determinism would be positively associated with the seeing 
and ultimately treating a person as an object in a manner that dismisses that person’s humanity. 
In a similar vein, this study investigated the association between belief in determinism 
and individuals’ propensity to exhibit personality traits of the Dark Triad. The Dark Triad 
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includes the dark personality traits of narcissism, psychopathy, and Machiavellianism, which are 
collectively known to share characteristics of disagreeableness, callousness, deceit, and 
manipulativeness. As argued in the literature, belief in determinism can promote a general 
disregard for moral responsibility, encourage a sense of entitlement and selfishness, and the 
dismissal of potential consequences of behavior. Based on this notion, I hypothesized that if an 
individual identified with deterministic beliefs, they might also exhibit signs of narcissism, as the 
two appear to be related. Thus, Hypothesis 2 predicted that belief in determinism, relative to 
belief in free will, would be positively associated with individuals’ propensity to demonstrate 
narcissistic qualities. 
For my third hypothesis, I expected that belief in determinism would be positively 
associated with individuals’ propensity to be characteristically psychopathic. More specifically, 
Hypothesis 3 predicted that, if an individual identifies with deterministic beliefs, they may be 
more susceptible to psychopathy, as individuals identifying with this belief will deem the 
consequences of their impulsive behavior a matter of inevitability and fail to acknowledge moral 
responsibility, thereby disregarding for the rights and wellbeing of others. 
Along with the previously cited features of the Dark Triad, narcissism and psychopathy, 
Machiavellianism is characterized be emotional instability and lower regard for morality. 
Research has shown that Machiavellianism is associated with flexible moral beliefs and 
emotional detachment, which allows for pragmatic decision-making in personal conflicts 
(Karandikar, Kapoor, Fernandes, & Jonason, 2019). Therefore, Hypothesis 4 predicted that belief 
in determinism, as opposed to belief in free will, would be positively associated with higher 
degrees of Machiavellianism and the propensity to manipulate others. 
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Finally, this study examined a potential mediation model between belief in determinism 
and the Dark Triad personality traits through interpersonal objectification and explored whether a 
mediation effect of interpersonal objectification existed between belief in determinism and dark 
personality traits. Hypothesis 5 was that interpersonal objectification would explain the 
relationship between belief in determinism and the Dark Triad (Machiavellianism, narcissism, 
and psychopathy). Specifically, I predicted that objectification (i.e., seeing and treating others as 
means to one’s own end) would explain the relationship between belief in determinism and the 
manifestation of dark personality traits (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Hypothesized mediation model. 
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CHAPTER III: METHOD 
Participants 
Participants were students attending Illinois State University. A total of 608 students 
participated in this study (117 men, 431 women, 3 transgender men, 2 transgender women, 6 
non-binary individuals, and 1 non-binary woman; 48 individuals did not to respond). The 
participants’ ages ranged from 18 to 55 (M = 21.34, SD = 4.37). The majority of students 
identified as White/Caucasian (75.0%), whereas 6.1% identified as Hispanic/Latinx, 4.8% 
identified as Black/African American, and 3.8% identified as Asian American. The remainder of 
the students identified as Biracial/Mixed (0.9%), Native American (0.3%), Pacific Islander 




The Free Will Inventory (FWI) measures belief in free will, while simultaneously 
measuring an individual’s belief in determinism, dualism, and non-reductionism (Nadelhoffer, 
Shepard, Nahmias, Sripada, & Ross, 2014). This 29-item self-report inventory consists of two 
parts, both using a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. 
Part 1 consists of three 5-item subscales that assess the strength of belief in free will, 
determinism, and dualism, respectively. Part 2 of the FWI is made up of 14 statements that 
consider the relationship between these beliefs. These additional statements allow for further 
exploration of individuals’ corresponding beliefs and attitudes about free will, determinism, 
choice, the soul, predictability, responsibility, and punishment. For the purposes of this study, 
only the free will and determinism subscales were used. The free will subscale included items 
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such as, “people always have the ability to do otherwise,” and the determinism scale included 
items such as, “everything that has ever happened had to happen precisely as it did, given what 
happened before” (see Appendix A). For this study, the Free Will and Determinism subscales 
achieved coefficient alphas of .81 and .76 respectively. 
Interpersonal Objectification 
Due to the lack of an existing measure of interpersonal objectification (vs. self-
objectification) in the literature, the Interpersonal Objectification (IO) scale was created for the 
purposes of this study. This measure was developed based on philosopher Martha Nussbaum’s 
conceptual analysis of objectification using the seven features (instrumentality, denial of 
autonomy, inertness, fungibility, violability, ownership, and denial of subjectivity) that she 
employed to describe the phenomenon of one person treating another as an object (i.e., 
objectifying them); A pool of 79-items were generated to map onto these seven features. Ten 
expert raters (i.e., psychology graduate students) were asked to validate this measure by rating 
each item’s relevance to objectification, using a multiple-choice format (i.e., seems highly 
relevant to objectification, seems somewhat relevant to objectification, can’t decide if it’s 
relevant, or seems irrelevant to objectification). Only items that achieved highly relevant to 
objectification from at least 80% of raters were retained. These 29-items were then included in 
the Interpersonal Objectification scale administered to participants using a Likert-type scale that 
ranged from strongly disagree to strongly agree (see Appendix B). 
Following data collection, a parallel analysis was conducted to determine the scale’s 
structure and optimal number of factors to retain (Hayton, Allen, & Scarpello, 2004). A three-
factor model was indicated because three factors exhibited eigenvalues that exceeded the 95th 
percentile, based on 500 random data sets with the same number of variables and sample size. 
 28 
Subsequently, a principle components analysis (PCA) with varimax rotation was conducted with 
the model restricted to three factors. Fourteen items were removed because they either had factor 
loading of less than .50 or loaded on multiple factors. This resulted in a three-factor model that 
was supported by a parallel analysis, scree plot, and the Kaiser criterion of an eigenvalue greater 
than one (Cattell, 1966; Kaiser, 1958). The interpersonal objectification scale includes subscales 
of perspective-taking (7 items, α = .77), sexual gratification (5 items, α = .77), and 
instrumentality (3 items, α = .51). The perspective-taking subscale included all reverse-scored 
items such as, “when I am involved or getting involved with someone, I want to understand on 
an intimate level who they are as a person.” The sexual gratification subscale included items 
such as, “If a person is not getting their sexual needs met in their primary relationship, it is okay 
to get them met elsewhere.” The instrumentality subscale included items such as, “in life, we all 
basically use other people as a means to our own ends.” Although the instrumentality subscale 
demonstrated the lowest reliability, it also captured theoretically essential aspects of 
interpersonal objectification, and thus these items were retained. The final scale utilized for 
analyses included all 15 items, and demonstrated adequate reliability, α = .78 (see Appendix C). 
Next, evidence for construct validity was explored by examining correlations with related 
constructs. The interpersonal objectification score demonstrated a strong positive correlation 
with objectification items used by Gruenfeld et al. (2008) (r = .42, p < .001), Psychopathy (r = 
.58, p < .001) and Machiavellianism (r = .41, p < .001), but a weaker correlation with 
Determinism (r = .24, p < .001) and Narcissism (r = .19, p < .001). There was no apparent 
association between interpersonal objectification and Free Will (r = –.04, p = .32). Evidence for 
criterion validity is provided by a strong negative correlation between interpersonal objectivity 
and the number of attention-check items that were correctly registered (r = –.35, p < .001) 
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suggesting that those who reported being willing to objectify others are less likely to demonstrate 
conscientious survey completion. 
Dark Triad 
The Short Dark Triad scale (SD3) is a self-report inventory that measures dark 
personality traits that together denote the Dark Triad (Jones & Paulhus, 2014). The questionnaire 
includes 27 items on a 5-point Likert-type scale with options ranging from disagree strongly and 
agree strongly. Nine items make up the Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy 
subscales. The Machiavellianism subscale focused on reputation, cynicism, coalition building, 
and strategic calculation, for example, “I like to use clever manipulation to get my way.” The 
narcissism subscale included items that centered around entitlement, grandiosity, and 
exhibitionism (e.g., “I insist on getting the respect I deserve”). The psychopathy subscale 
measured included items that focused on antisocial behavior, erratic lifestyle, callous affect, and 
short-term manipulation (e.g., “people often say I’m out of control”) (see Appendix D). 
According to Jones and Paulhus (2014), support for validity was established as the subscales 
successfully mapped onto established inventories: the Dirty Dozen (Jonason & Webster, 2010), 
the Self-Report Psychopathy Scale (SRP-III; Paulhus, Neumann, & Hare, in press; Williams, 
Paulhus, & Hare, 2007), the Mach-IV (Christie & Geis, 1970), the Narcissistic Personality 
Inventory (NPI; Raskin & Hall, 1979), and the International Personality Item Pool–Interpersonal 
Circumplex (IPIP-IPC; Markey & Markey, 2009). For this study, Cronbach coefficient alphas 
ranged from .68 and .75 for the three subscales. 
Objectification 
Gruenfeld and colleagues (2008) created a scale to measure objectification within work 
relationships. The items used in this scale are equivalent to the central features of objectification 
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proposed by Nussbaum (1995). Participants were presented with two prompts; the subordinate 
target condition involved a professional relationship that was hierarchical, whereas the peer 
target condition involved a professional relationship that was not hierarchical. Participants were 
then asked to report their agreement of statements related to their perception of their work 
relationship (e.g., “I think more about what this person can do for me than what I can do for 
him/her”). This questionnaire included 10 self-report items on a 7-point Likert-type scale with 
items ranging from disagree strongly to agree strongly (see Appendix E). In the present study, 
Cronbach’s coefficient alpha was .77. 
Procedure 
Following approval by Illinois State University's Institutional Review Board (IRB), 
participants were recruited using an online system, SONA, run by the Illinois State University 
Department of Psychology. Extra credit for psychology courses was offered as compensation for 
these students. Additional participants were recruited through a university-wide email sent to 
students enrolled at the university. This email included a brief explanation of the study and an 
anonymous Qualtrics link. These participants had the opportunity to enter a raffle for a chance to 
win a $20 Amazon gift card. Following recruitment, participants were prompted to read and 
electronically sign an informed consent form. From there, participants completed a set of 
questionnaires including the FWI, the IO, the SD3, and the OS. After all questionnaires were 
completed, participants were debriefed on the purpose of the study. 
Data Analysis Plan 
Descriptive statistics for study variables were analyzed first. Bivariate correlations 
between belief in free will and determinism, interpersonal objectification, and the Dark Triad 
were examined using Pearson correlation analyses. Correlation analyses were used to test the 
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first four hypotheses of this study, which predicted that belief in determinism would be 
positively associated with objectification and the Dark Triad (i.e., narcissism, psychopathy, and 
Machiavellianism). 
To examine Hypothesis 5, which predicted that the association between determinism and 
the Dark Triad would be mediated by interpersonal objectification, I used PROCESS analyses 
(Hayes, 2018). This analytic procedure assessed the indirect effects of belief in determinism and 
narcissism, psychopathy, and Machiavellianism through interpersonal objectification. I used the 
determinism subscale of the FWI, the total score from the 15-item IO scale, and the respective 
subscales from the SD3 to analyze three mediation models. The criterion for statistical 
significance was p < .05. 
For each of the three indirect effects, I used bootstrapping to determine the significance 
of indirect effects. The process of bootstrapping involves drawing, with replacement, 5,000 
samples of N = 608 from the sample of 608 participants, which is used as a population reservoir. 
Hayes (2018) PROCESS analyses computed unstandardized indirect effects of each bootstrapped 
sample. These 5,000 samples were used to determine a 95% confidence interval for each of the 
three outcome variables: Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy. 
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CHAPTER IV: RESULTS 
Participants completed four questionnaires to assess their general levels of belief in free 
will and determinism (FWI), interpersonal objectification (IO and OS), and dark personality 
traits (SD3). Table 1 shows the respective range, means, and standard deviations for the scales 
and subscales of the present study’s measures. 
Table 1. 
Means and Standard Deviations for Belief in Free Will, Interpersonal Objectification, and The 
Dark Triad Measures 
Variable Total 
 Range M SD 
FWI-Free Will 1-7.00 4.60 1.19 
FWI-Determinism 1-7.00 3.35 1.16 
IO-Perspective-Taking 1-7.00 1.83 0.71 
IO-Sexual 1-5.80 1.58 0.78 
IO-Instrumentality 1-6.67 3.32 1.12 
IO-Total 1-4.40 2.05 0.62 
OS 1-6.30 3.31 0.87 
SD3-Machiavellianism 1-5.00 2.84 0.59 
SD3-Narcissism 1-4.78 2.81 0.53 
SD3-Psychopathy 1-4.11 2.06 0.58 
Note. FWI = Free Will Inventory; IO = Interpersonal Objectification Scale; OS = Objectification 
Scale; SD3 = Short Dark Triad. 
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Main Analyses 
Correlations were computed to examine the relations among belief in free will, belief in 
determinism, interpersonal objectification, and the Dark Triad (see Table 2). First, belief in free 
will was only positively associated with belief in determinism and narcissism. Belief in free will 
was negatively associated with the interpersonal objectification total, the perspective-taking and 
instrumentality subscales of the interpersonal objectification scale, the objectification scale, and 
psychopathy, though none of these correlations were statistically significant. 
Belief in determinism was positively correlated with interpersonal objectification, as 
demonstrated by the positive associations between belief in determinism and the interpersonal 
objectification subscales (perspective-taking, sexual, and instrumentality) and the interpersonal 
objectification total. Belief in determinism was also positively correlated with the objectification 
scale assessing objectification and power within work relationships. These correlational findings 
provide support for Hypothesis 1A, which was that belief in determinism would be positively 
associated with individuals’ propensity to objectify others. 
There were also positive correlations between belief in determinism and the Dark Triad. 
Belief in determinism was positively correlated with measures of narcissism, psychopathy, and 
most strongly correlated with Machiavellianism. Belief in determinism was correlated with 
narcissism, providing support for Hypothesis 2, which was that belief in determinism would 
positively correlate with individuals’ propensity to be narcissistic. Belief in determinism was 
also positively associated with psychopathy, which provided support for Hypothesis 3, predicting 
that belief in determinism would be positively associated with individuals’ propensity to be 
psychopathic. Finally, belief in determinism was positively correlated with Machiavellianism, 
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providing support for Hypothesis 4, predicting that belief in determinism would be positively 
associated with individuals’ propensity to be Machiavellian and manipulate others.
 
Table 2. 
Correlations among Scores on Belief in Free Will, Interpersonal Objectification, and The Dark Triad Measures 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. FWI-Free Will -          
2. FWI-Determinism .12** -         
3. IO-Perspective-Taking -.05 .14** -        
4. IO-Sexual .00 .20** .46** -       
5. IO-Instrumentality -.05 .21** .20** .30** -      
6. IO-Total -.04 .24** .80** .78** .61** -     
7. OS -.04 .17** .31** .30** .34** .42** -    
8. SD3-Machivellianism .06 .30** .23** .29** .44** .41** .39** -   
9. SD3-Narcissism .09* .17** .07 .19** .18** .18** .25** .33** -  
10. SD3-Psychopathy -.04 .20** .43** .46** .39** .58** .35** .52** .31** - 
Note. FWI = Free Will Inventory; IO = Interpersonal Objectification Scale; OS = Objectification Scale; SD3= Short Dark Triad. *p < 




Finally, I tested Hypothesis 5, which was that interpersonal objectification would mediate 
the relationship between the belief in determinism and the Dark Triad personality traits. There 
were significant pathways between belief in determinism and narcissism (b = .08, t(565) = 4.23, 
p < .001), psychopathy (b = .10, t(563) = 4.89, p < .001), and Machiavellianism (b = .16, t(565) 
= 7.63, p < .001). 
Narcissism 
In support of the hypothesis that objectification would mediate the association between 
belief in determinism and narcissism, the bootstrapped indirect effect of belief in determinism on 
narcissism through interpersonal objectification was statistically significant, b = .02, 95% CI = 
[.01, .03]. This suggests that the relationship between belief in determinism and individuals’ 
propensity to be narcissistic was mediated by interpersonal objectification (see Figure 2); 
however, variability remained between belief in determinism and narcissism. Results 
demonstrated that belief in determinism and interpersonal objectification accounted for 5% of the 





Figure 2. Unstandardized regression coefficients for the mediation analysis of belief in 
determinism, interpersonal objectification, and narcissism. CI = confidence interval. 
*** p < .001. 
Psychopathy 
In support of the hypothesis that objectification would mediate the association between 
belief in determinism and psychopathy, the bootstrapped, unstandardized indirect effect of belief 
in determinism on psychopathy through interpersonal objectification was statistically significant, 
b = .07, 95% CI = [.04, .10]. The relationship between belief in determinism and individuals’ 
propensity to be psychopathic was also mediated by interpersonal objectification (see Figure 3). 
Similar to the narcissism model, variability remained between belief in determinism and 
psychopathy, suggesting that there may be other aspects of deterministic beliefs—other than 
interpersonal objectification—that account for psychopathic traits. Results demonstrated that 
belief in determinism and interpersonal objectification accounted for 33% of the variance in 





Figure 3. Unstandardized regression coefficients for the mediation analysis of belief in 
determinism, interpersonal objectification, and psychopathy. CI = confidence interval. 
*** p < .001. 
Machiavellianism 
In support of the hypothesis that objectification would mediate the relation between belief 
in determinism and Machiavellianism, the bootstrapped, unstandardized indirect effect of belief 
in determinism on Machiavellianism through interpersonal objectification was statistically 
significant, b = .04, 95% CI = [.02, .07], see Figure 4. Similar to the other two models, variability 
remained between belief in determinism and Machiavellianism, suggesting that other aspects 
than interpersonal objectification may influence Machiavellianism. Results demonstrated that 
belief in determinism and interpersonal objectification accounted for 21% of the variance in 
Machiavellianism, F(2, 564) = 76.38, p < .001, R2 = .21. 
 
 
Figure 4. Unstandardized regression coefficients for the mediation analysis of belief in 
determinism, interpersonal objectification, and Machiavellianism. CI = confidence interval. 
*** p < .001.  
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CHAPTER V: DISCUSSION 
Research has demonstrated that belief in determinism can negatively affect behavior 
because this belief requires a decreased need for volition and self-control (Alquist, Ainsworth, & 
Baumeister, 2013; Baumeister, Masicampo, & DeWall, 2009; Stillman & Baumeister, 2010; 
Vohs & Schooler, 2008). In support of Bergner and Ramon’s (2013) notion that perceiving that 
one has “no choice in the matter” is associated with disregarding one’s personal responsibility 
and increased moral disengagement, the present study’s empirical findings suggest that another 
possibly salient accompaniment of belief in determinism is the likelihood to objectify others and 
exhibit antisocial tendencies. Specifically, the present study examined the association between 
beliefs in determinism, interpersonal objectification, and self-reported dark personality traits. 
The present study’s results lend evidence to previous theoretical and empirical work that suggest 
that deterministic beliefs may either help motivate or rationalize antisocial behavior. 
The results of this study do not demonstrate a causal relationship between belief in 
determinism, interpersonal objectification, or dark personality traits. They simply indicate 
empirical associations between these constructs. Overall, results provide evidence that 
deterministic ideologies are associated with unfavorable interpersonal tendencies. However, it is 
possible that, if any causal possibilities exist with respect to this association, these may exist in 
the opposite direction (i.e., maladaptive personality traits influencing maladaptive ideologies. 
Results supported my first two hypotheses, namely that belief in free will would be 
negatively associated with objectification and that belief in determinism would be positively 
associated with interpersonal objectification. Specifically predicting that with no behavioral 
alternatives to consider, individuals may feel less accountable for their actions (Feldman et al., 
2016), and in turn, objectify others based on their utility. This is an important addition to the 
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existing literature. Although multiple studies have shown that belief in free will is closely related 
to prosocial behavior (Baumeister, Masicampo, & DeWall, 2009) and socially desirable beliefs 
(Vonasch & Baumeister, 2012), the present study adds to this literature by providing evidence 
that beliefs in determinism are also linked to the tendency to objectify others, rather than viewing 
them as autonomous beings. 
The present study also found support for hypotheses that deterministic beliefs would be 
associated with increased antisocial tendencies. Results of this study support these claims, as 
belief in determinism was linked to narcissism, psychopathy, and Machiavellianism. Within 
established literature, belief in determinism has been empirically associated with vindictive and 
antisocial behavior (Caspar, Vuillaume, Magalhães De Saldanha da Gama, & Cleeremans, 2017), 
diminished self-control (Alquist, Ainsworth, & Baumeister, 2013), limited impulse control 
(Cave, 2016), and aggression (Baumeister, Masicampo, DeWall, 2009). 
While I hypothesized that deterministic beliefs would be positively associated with 
narcissism, and belief in free will would be negatively associated with narcissism, results 
indicated that both beliefs were positively linked to narcissism. This finding, while 
unprecedented, is consistent with previous research that demonstrated a link between 
deterministic beliefs and narcissism, as belief in determinism could potentially serve as a catalyst 
for impulsive selfishness and the advancement of one’s own self-interest (Protzko, Ouimette, & 
Schooler, 2016). It was somewhat unexpected that free will beliefs demonstrated a similar 
relation with narcissism. In contrast to the much of the research cited above, Nadelhoffer and 
Tocchetto (2013) have put forth evidence suggesting that believing in free will may be associated 
with tendencies toward right-wing authoritarianism and just world beliefs. Future research could 
investigate these apparently contradictory results and implications. 
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In support of my hypothesis, belief in determinism was empirically associated with 
psychopathic tendencies. It may be possible that individuals identifying with deterministic 
beliefs might demonstrate psychopathic tendencies and deem ramifications of their impulsive 
behavior a matter of inevitability, thereby disregarding moral responsibility. Results in the 
present study support this notion that belief in determinism is linked to antisocial proneness 
(Stillman & Baumeister, 2010; Vohs & Schooler, 2008). However, contrary to my hypothesis, 
belief in free will was not associated with psychopathic tendencies. While previous research 
demonstrates a link between belief in free will, prosocial behavior, and a reduction of disruptive 
behavior (Bergner & Ramon, 2013), the present study’s results are less conclusive—as there was 
no statistically significant relationship. 
In support of my hypothesis, belief in determinism was associated with greater trait 
Machiavellianism and the tendency to manipulate others through dismissal of morality. This 
fourth hypothesis was developed based on the mutual dismissal of morality between belief in 
determinism and Machiavellianism. Bergner and Ramon (2013) argue that belief in determinism 
lends itself to the general disregard of morality. Specifically noting that deterministic beliefs 
involve little to no agency, which may result in diminished responsibility and, in turn, no 
morality to consider. Individuals exhibiting Machiavellian characteristics typically view others 
as objects to be manipulated while neglecting conventional morality. 
I hypothesized that interpersonal objectification would represent a tendency that could 
account for the positive association between one’s belief in determinism and their Dark Triad 
personality traits. Results also supported the hypothesized mediation model, as interpersonal 
objectification partially mediated the relationship between deterministic beliefs and dark 
personality traits. The maladaptive ideology of determinism and the maladaptive personality 
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traits of narcissism, psychopathy, and Machiavellianism may share a common theme–
objectifying other human beings. Interpersonal objectification and dark personality traits fall on 
continuums that include adaptive and maladaptive manifestations that may be problematic 
(Baumeister & Brewer, 2012; Paulhus & Williams, 2002; Rector, 2017). The mediation model in 
this study indicated that belief in determinism was empirically linked to the Dark Triad 
personality traits, which may be related to deterministic beliefs that allow for the disavowal of 
others’ humanity. 
Implications 
This research has implications for our theoretical understanding of belief in free will and 
determinism. Psychologists argue that free will beliefs are linked to experience with and 
assumptions about human agency that allow for self-control and rational choice related to moral 
responsibility (Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer, & Turner, 2005; Wegner, 2004). By reason of 
perceived control, belief in free will has been accepted as an adaptive, ungrounded belief (cf. 
Smithdeal, 2016). Sarkissian et al. (2010) found that, through intuition and shared experience, 
most believe our universe is indeterministic and moral responsibility is incompatible with 
determinism. Free will beliefs are embedded within Western religion, philosophy, and legal 
precedent (Baumeister et al., 2009; Rakos, Laurene, Skala, & Slane, 2008), it is unclear how or 
why individuals come to hold deterministic beliefs. Future research might explore various 
biological, psychological, and social factors that facilitate an individual’s belief in determinism. 
The research and findings of this study informs and strengthens our understanding of how 
belief in determinism, objectification, and dark personality traits may be related to unfavorable 
outcomes. Belief in determinism appears to be associated with decreased personal moral 
responsibility and increased self-reported antisocial tendencies. However, the present study did 
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not find conclusive links between beliefs in free will and interpersonal objectification and Dark 
Triad personality traits. In fact, the correlation between beliefs in free will and determinism was 
positive (albeit very small, r = .12). This suggests that many people may hold somewhat 
theoretically conflicting views about the nature of their personal agency at the same time (cf. 
Hannikainen et al., 2019; Nichols & Knobe, 2007). Understanding how people resolve these 
internal conflicts (or not) may be useful empirical work that provides insight into the extent to 
which people emphasize, ignore, or contextualize one ideology that seemingly contradicts 
another that they hold. 
This research also establishes a link between belief in determinism and interpersonal 
objectification. Objectification has been understood as the seeing and treating others as objects 
through denial of their humanity, ultimately undermining the target’s personhood. Research 
suggests that targets of objectification typically experience guilt, shame, reduced self-esteem, 
depression, feelings of worthlessness, and potential self-objectification (i.e., the preoccupation 
with one’s appearance, resulting in frequent body surveillance) as a result of being objectified 
(Orehek & Weaverling, 2017). Recognizing that interpersonal objectification, at its extreme, 
involves dehumanization and violence has very straightforward and obvious implications for 
morality. 
Belief in determinism may be one ideological orientation that encourages self-
exoneration and moral disengagement. Identifying correlations among belief in determinism and 
negative outcomes does not necessarily mean that this belief will immediately lead to deviant or 
maladaptive behavior (Smithdeal, 2016). Bandura (2002) argues that moral agency is a self-
regulatory process linking moral reasoning and moral action. This self-regulatory process 
encourages humane behavior through moral self-sanctions and allows inhumane behavior 
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through self-exonerations by way of moral disengagement. Moral disengagement is a matter of 
selective activation and disengagement using moral justification, diffusion or displacement of 
responsibility, minimizing or distorting harm inflicted, or dehumanizing and blaming the victim 
(Bandura, 2002). Bandura’s (1986) social cognitive theory proposes an interactionist perspective 
that views moral behavior as a product of shared cognitive, affective, and social influences. 
Belief in determinism may be an ideological belief that is associated with an individuals’ 
inclination to disengage morally. Future research might consider the association between 
deterministic beliefs and a tendency towards moral disengagement. 
This research has implications for the clinical treatment of perpetrators and victims of 
objectification and maladaptive personality traits. Recognizing potential underlying factors of 
objectification and dark personality traits include dismissal of or disregard for moral 
responsibility may be a useful focal point for intervention. Feminist, existential, and choice 
therapeutic approaches may be effective interventions for enhancing individuals’ moral 
reasoning through acceptance of responsibility and awareness of free will. Individuals exhibiting 
dark personality traits may also benefit from therapeutic interventions that enhance impulse 
control and behavioral inhibition. Victims of objectification may benefit from psychotherapy that 
challenges their internalized guilt and shame, reduced self-esteem, and feelings of worthlessness 
that contribute to depression and self-objectification. 
This study also has implications for future research and measurement of interpersonal 
objectification. Based on the limited research and lack of established measures of interpersonal 
objectification, previous research has used variations of self-objectification scales to measure the 
objectification of others (Bevens & Loughnan, 2019). The newly developed interpersonal 
objectification measure employed in this study included only items that had been rated very 
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highly by a panel of trained graduate student raters as capturing the concept of objectification. 
Thus, there are grounds for assuming that, in keeping with the classical criterion of construct 
validity that a measure's "construct validity is the degree to which a test measures what it claims, 
or purports, to be measuring" (Brown, 1996, p. 231), that this scale measures up in this regard. 
However, on more enhanced statistical analyses undertaken, it demonstrated only modest 
validity. Overall, there is some reason to believe that this instrument lays the foundation for 
future research investigating the presence and consequences of interpersonal objectification. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
One limitation of this research is its cross-sectional nature. The present study does not 
differentiate between cause and effect. The correlational analyses used within this study 
examined the association between variables, assuming directional correlations among belief in 
determinism, objectification, and dark personality. Specifically predicting that belief in 
determinism would lead to increased objectification and manifestation of dark personality traits. 
However, this study does not examine the potential for a transactional relationship among these 
variables. Future research might explore bidirectional associations among belief in determinism 
and objectification, and belief in determinism and the Dark Triad, to consider investigation of 
this belief as a justification for maladaptive attitudes or behaviors. Additional research may also 
consider using a longitudinal or experimental design to investigate the links between 
deterministic beliefs and undesirable outcomes. 
An additional limitation of the present study is the generalizability of these findings. 
Although previous research has demonstrated a surprising level of cross-cultural convergence 
with regards to free will beliefs and incompatibilism between determinism and moral 
responsibility (Sarkissian, Chatterjee, De Brigard, Knobe, Nichols, & Sirker, 2010), the 
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homogeneity of this study’s sample may impede the generalizability of these results. It is also 
possible that college students respond differently to the questionnaires used in this study due to 
the relatively abstract theoretical concepts considered. Future research could explore individual 
and cultural variations in belief in determinism, and how this may influence the association 
between conditions for belief in determinism and moral responsibility. 
A final limitation of the present study is the measure used to assess interpersonal 
objectification. The measure created for the purposes of this study was developed based on the 
seven philosophical features proposed by Martha Nussbaum (1995). Following item generation, 
psychology graduate students were provided a detailed explanation of objectification in contrast 
to treating people as people to establish construct validity. Unfortunately, an exploratory factor 
analysis revealed that only three factors remained (perspective-taking, sexual gratification, and 
instrumentality). A follow-up study should be conducted to improve validity and reliability of 
this measure. 
Conclusion 
The present study contributes to existing literature suggesting that belief in determinism 
is linked to maladaptive attitudes and behavior. One’s belief in determinism was found to be 
associated with a greater tendency to objectify others, which in turn may be linked to 
overarching darker personality traits such as narcissism, psychopathy, and Machiavellianism. 
Believing that the universe is predestined to be the way it is and that one does not have the 
ability to control their own decisions and actions may lead some individuals down a maladaptive 
and manipulative path. They may reduce others to objects, rather than viewing them as subjects 
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APPENDIX A: FREE WILL INVENTORY 
Instructions: Please indicate how much you agree with each of the following statements. 
 
FWI Part 1: 
The Free Will Subscale (FW): 
1. People always have the ability to do otherwise. 
2. People always have free will. 
3. How people’s lives unfold is completely up to them. 
4. People ultimately have complete control over their decisions and their actions. 
5. People have free will even when their choices are completely limited by circumstances. 
The Determinism Subscale (DE): 
1. Everything that has ever happened had to happen precisely as it did, given what happened 
before. 
2. Every event that has ever occurred, including human decisions and actions, was 
completely determined by prior events. 
3. People’s choices and actions must happen precisely the way they do because of the laws 
of nature and the way things were in the distant past. 
4. A supercomputer that could know everything about the way the universe is now could 
know everything about the way the universe will be in the future. 
5. Given the way things were at the Big Bang, there is only one way for everything to 


























The Dualism/Anti-Reductionism Scale (DU): 
1. The fact that we have souls that are distinct from our material bodies is what makes 
humans unique. 
2. Each person has a non-physical essence that makes that person unique. 
3. The human mind cannot simply be reduced to the brain. 
4. The human mind is more than just a complicated biological machine. 
5. Human action can only be understood in terms of our souls and minds and not just in 
terms of our brains. 
FWI Part 2: 
1. Free will is the ability to make different choices even if everything leading up to one’s 
choice (e.g., the past, the situation, and their desires, beliefs, etc.) were exactly the same. 
2. Free will is the ability to make a choice based on one’s beliefs and desires such that, if 
one had different beliefs or desires, one’s choice would have been different as well. 
3. People could have free will even if scientists discovered all of the laws that govern all 
human behavior. 
4. To have free will means that a person’s decisions and actions could not be perfectly 
predicted by someone else no matter how much information they had. 
5. If it turned out that people lacked non-physical (or immaterial) souls, then they would 
lack free will. 
6. To have free will is to be able to cause things to happen in the world without at the same 
time being caused to make those things happen. 
7. People have free will as long as they are able to do what they want without being coerced 
or constrained by other people. 
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8. To be responsible for our present decisions and actions we must also be responsible for 
all of our prior decisions and actions that led up to the present moment. 
9. People deserve to be blamed and punished for bad actions only if they acted of their own 
free will. 
10. People who harm others deserve to be punished even if punishing them will not produce 
any positive benefits to either the offender or society—e.g., rehabilitation, deterring other 
would-be offenders, etc. 
11. People who perform harmful actions ought to be rehabilitated so they no longer pose a 
threat to society. 
12. People who perform harmful actions ought to be punished so that other potential 
offenders are deterred from committing similar harmful actions. 
13. People could be morally responsible even if scientists discovered all of the laws that 
govern human behavior. 
14. If it turned out that people lacked non-physical (or immaterial) souls, then they would 




APPENDIX B: INTERPERSONAL OBJECTIFICATION SCALE VALIDATION 
Instructions: Please indicate how much you agree with each of the following statements. 
 
1. In life, we all basically use other people as a means to our own ends. 
2. Forcing someone to have sex against his or her will is immoral. (R) 
3. Telling someone that you love them, even if you don’t, in order to get them to have 
sexual relations with you is immoral. (R) 
4. It is important to me to be aware of and respect any sexual dislikes or limits that my 
partner expresses. (R) 
5. If someone doesn't do as I request, I look to find someone else who will. 
6. Pretending to have no money to get another person to pay for your meal is immoral. (R) 
7. It's not a big deal when a man grabs a woman's butt at a party or a bar. 
8. If you are not deriving sufficient sexual gratification in your relationship with a 
committed partner, it is okay to fool around a little so long as it doesn't hurt your 
committed partner. 
9. In close relationships, there should be a balance of power where each person has an equal 
say in most decisions. (R) 
10. When first meeting someone who interests me, I take note of particular body parts such 
as their legs, eyes, chest, etc. 


























12. If I am in a sexual relationship with someone, it is important that I ask her/him about 
personal sexual likes and dislikes. (R) 
13. People basically fill different places in your life such as best friends, romantic partner, or 
drinking buddy. In general, it is okay to replace them if you find others who can do a 
better job. 
14. When I have lost a friend, I find it easy to replace that friend with a new one. 
15. I believe that, when you are in love with someone, there is something irreplaceable about 
them–even though others might be just as attractive and as nice, you don't feel like they 
could replace your loved one. (R) 
16. In a sexual situation, if someone says "no," I think it's okay to keep pushing to see if they 
really mean it. 
17. Coming on aggressively to get an unwilling person to have sex with you is okay. 
18. When I am involved or getting involved with someone, I want to understand on an 
intimate level who they really are as a person. (R) 
19. If a person is not getting their sexual needs met in their primary relationship, it is okay to 
get them met elsewhere. 
20. It is morally wrong for a business owner to fire one employee and hire another employee 
because they could be paid less. (R) 
21. Taking credit for work that a coworker actually did to get a promotion is wrong. (R) 
22. If I am in a serious romantic relationship, I feel as though my partner is in a sense my 
property until that relationship ends. 




24. In a recent drama, a man says to a woman: "If you aren't going to meet my needs, I'll find 
someone who can." I believe that this man's attitude is an acceptable one. 
25. I often try to pay attention to the feelings of those around me. (R) 
26. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their 
perspective. (R) 
27. The primary reason to make friends is because friends will likely be useful to you. 
28. In a sexual encounter, it is important for both parties to respect the desires, as well as the 
personal limits, of the other. (R) 




APPENDIX C: INTERPERSONAL OBJECTIFICATION SCALE 
Instructions: Please indicate how much you agree with each of the following statements. 
 
Perspective-Taking 
1. Pretending to have no money to get another person to pay for your meal is immoral. (R) 
2. In close relationships, there should be a balance of power where each person has an equal 
say in most decisions. (R) 
3. If I am in a sexual relationship with someone, it is important that I ask them about 
personal sexual likes and dislike. (R) 
4. When I am involved or getting involved with someone, I want to understand on an 
intimate level who they are as a person. (R) 
5. The practice of purchasing a bride, still observed in many countries around the world, is 
immoral. (R) 
6. I often try to pay attention to the feelings of those around me. (R) 
7. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their 
perspective. (R) 
Sexual Gratification 
1. It’s not a big deal when a man grabs a woman’s butt at a party or a bar. 
2. If you are not deriving sexual gratification in your relationship with a committed partner, 


























3. In a sexual situation, if someone says “no,” I think it’s okay to keep pushing to see if they 
really mean it. 
4. Coming on aggressively to get an unwilling person to have sex with you is okay. 
5. If a person is not getting their sexual needs met in their primary relationship, it is okay to 
get them met elsewhere. 
Instrumentality 
1. In life, we all basically use other people as a means to our own ends. 
2. If someone doesn’t do as I request, I look to find someone else who will. 
3. People basically fill different places in your life such as best friends, a romantic partners, 





APPENDIX D: SHORT DARK TRIAD 
Instructions: Please indicate how much you agree with each of the following statements. 
 
Machiavellianism 
1. It’s not wise to tell your secrets. 
2. I like to use clever manipulation to get my way. 
3. Whatever it takes, you must get the important people on your side. 
4. Avoid direct conflict with others because they may be useful in the future. 
5. It’s wise to keep track of information that you can use against people later. 
6. You should wait for the right time to get back at people. 
7. There are things you should hide from other people to preserve your reputation. 
8. Make sure your plans benefit yourself, not others. 
9. Most people can be manipulated. 
Narcissism 
1. People see me as a natural leader. 
2. I hate being the center of attention. (R) 
3. Many group activities tend to be dull without me. 
4. I know that I am special because everyone keeps telling me so. 
5. I like to get acquainted with important people. 
6. I feel embarrassed if someone compliments me. (R) 
7. I have been compared to famous people. 















9. I insist on getting the respect I deserve. 
Psychopathy 
1. I like to get revenge on authorities. 
2. I avoid dangerous situations. (R) 
3. Payback needs to be quick and nasty. 
4. People often say I’m out of control. 
5. It’s true that I can be mean to others. 
6. People who mess with me always regret it. 
7. I have never gotten into trouble with the law. (R) 
8. I enjoy having sex with people I hardly know. 




APPENDIX E: OBJECTIFICATION SCALE 
Instructions: Consider a previous or current work relationship. Please indicate how much you 
agree with each of the following statements based on your perception of the relationship. 
 
1. I think more about what this person can do for me than what I can do for him/her. 
2. I tend to contact this person only when I need something from him/her. 
3. I am interested in this person’s feelings because I want to be close with him/her. (R) 
4. I try to motivate him/her to do things that will help me succeed. 
5. The relationship is important to me because it helps me accomplish my goals. 
6. This person is very useful to me. 
7. My relationship with this person is based on how much I enjoy our relationship, rather 
than how productive our relationship is. (R) 
8. If the nature of my job (or his/her job) changed and this person wasn’t helpful anymore, 
the relationship probably wouldn’t continue. 
9. Someone else with the same skill set could become equally important to me. 
10. I really like this person a lot even though s/he is not all that useful to me. (R) 
 



























APPENDIX F: INFORMED CONSENT 
SONA System Informed Consent 
You are being asked to participate in a research study conducted by Rachel Boros, 
Graduate Student in the Clinical-Counseling Psychology program at Illinois State University. 
The purpose of this research is to examine potential implications of certain widely promoted 
beliefs in American society; specifically, if and how these beliefs may affect individual’s moral 
behavior and psychological well-being. 
Participants must be 18 years and older to take part in the study. If you choose to 
participate, the survey will take approximately 20 minutes to complete. Your participation in this 
study is voluntary and you may withdraw from the study at any time without penalty. You are 
ineligible to participate if you are currently within the European Economic Area. 
Your participation will be compensated through 0.5 SONA credits that may be used as 
extra credit in your psychology courses. While you might not be directly benefiting from this 
study, the study has significant implications for very important societal issues regarding factors 
affecting people’s moral behavior and psychological well-being. 
The findings from this study may be presented in conferences, meetings, and 
publications. We do not anticipate any risks beyond those that would occur in everyday life. If 
you have any questions regarding the present research study or wish to withdraw from the study, 
contact Dr. Raymond Bergner at rmbergn@ilstu.edu. If you have any questions about your rights 
as a participant, or if you feel you have been placed at risk, contact the Illinois State University 
Research Ethics & Compliance Office at (309) 438-5527 or IRB@ilstu.edu. 
Please indicate below if you are willing to be in the study. By selecting the “Yes” option, 
you are indicating that you voluntarily agree to participate in this study, that the study has been 
 
 67 
explained to you, and that you have been given the time to read the document and that your 
questions have been satisfactorily answered. 
Please be sure to save this consent as a PDF or print a copy for your records. 
Mass Email Informed Consent 
You are being asked to participate in a research study conducted by Rachel Boros, 
Graduate Student in the Clinical-Counseling Psychology program at Illinois State University. 
The purpose of this research is to examine potential implications of certain widely promoted 
beliefs in American society; specifically, if and how these beliefs may affect individual’s moral 
behavior and psychological well-being. 
Participants must be 18 years and older to take part in the study. If you choose to 
participate, the survey will take approximately 20 minutes to complete. Your participation in this 
study is voluntary and you may withdraw from the study at any time without penalty. You are 
ineligible to participate if you are currently within the European Economic Area. 
To compensate you for your time spent on this study, you can be entered into a raffle for 
a $20 Amazon gift card. To be eligible, you will be taken to a separate page at the end of the 
survey to enter your contact information. This information will be kept entirely separate from the 
survey and your responses. Once the compensation is distributed, we will delete your contact 
information. The IRS may consider these payments to be taxable compensation. Recipients of a 
research participant incentive payment may want to consult with their personal tax advisor for 
advice regarding the participant's situation. Any participant also has the opportunity to 
participate in the study without accepting the research incentive payment. 
The findings from this study may be presented in conferences, meetings, and 
publications. We do not anticipate any risks beyond those that would occur in everyday life. If 
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you have any questions regarding the present research study or wish to withdraw from the study, 
contact Dr. Raymond Bergner at rmbergn@ilstu.edu. If you have any questions about your rights 
as a participant, or if you feel you have been placed at risk, contact the Illinois State University 
Research Ethics & Compliance Office at (309) 438-5527 or IRB@ilstu.edu. 
Please indicate below if you are willing to be in the study. By selecting the “Yes” option, 
you are indicating that you voluntarily agree to participate in this study, that the study has been 
explained to you, and that you have been given the time to read the document and that your 
questions have been satisfactorily answered. 




APPENDIX G: DEBRIEFING STATEMENT 
Debriefing Statement 
Thank you for your participation. The responses you provided are completely anonymous 
and will remain confidential. 
The purpose of this study was to investigate potential implications of believing in free 
will; more specifically, if and how a belief in the alternative, determinism, may affect 
individuals' moral behavior and psychological well-being. Your responses to this survey may 
provide insight into the effects of widely accepted beliefs, but possibly personally and socially 
damaging belief systems in American society. 
I hope and believe that this questionnaire did not cause any distress. However, if you are 
experiencing personal distress, you can participate in free counseling services at Illinois State 
University Student Counseling Services, located on the third floor of the Student Services 
Building. Call (309)438-3655 or schedule an appointment online at 
https://counseling.illinoisstate.edu/. 
This research is supervised by Raymond Bergner, PhD, Professor in Psychology. You 
can reach him at (309)438-8190, via email at rmbergn@ilstu.edu, or at his office in room 440 of 
DeGarmo Hall. 
A majority of research conducted in psychology is dependent on voluntary participation 




Rachel Boros  
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